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Abstract
We present a combined, consistent microsimulation-AGE model that uses the
labour market model PACE-L, data from the German Socio-Economic Panel
and a discrete choice labour supply estimation. The model is used to analyse
reform proposals designed to encourage labour force participation at the lower
end of the wage distribution. We compare the fully disaggregated version of
the model with an intermediate aggregation level. The results indicate that
for a number of macroeconomic results the level of aggregation is of secondary
importance. However, for certain subgroups of the households and for decom-
position along the intensive and extensive margin, results diﬀer substantially
so that full disaggregation is an indispensable part of the analysis.
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Some text to be generated.1 Introduction
Many European countries keep experimenting with reforms of labour market insti-
tutions and the tax and welfare system that target the low-skilled segment of labour
supply and demand (for a recent overview see Orsini, 2005). Here, the general condi-
tions for employment gains are particularly diﬃcult because negative demand eﬀects
from skill-biased technological change and shifting world trade patterns meet with
supply disincentives resulting from the tax and transfer schemes. A speciﬁcf o c u si s
on this latter “poverty trap” which is caused by a combination of a too small diﬀer-
ence between the welfare beneﬁts when non-employed and net earnings at low wage
levels, and a too high transfer withdrawal rate. Concrete policy proposals that aim
at an amelioration of this situation face two main diﬃculties. First, those who are
not able to work can not compensate the reduction in the welfare payments by more
intense search on the labour market. For this group income losses are considered to
be inacceptable. Secondly, lower transfer withdrawal rates usually lead to windfall
proﬁts for those workers who are in the respective income bracket and already active
in the labour market. These windfall proﬁts and the ensuing tax revenue losses can
be so large to make the reforms infeasible from a public budget point of view.
The ex-ante assessment of such reforms thus requires economic models that are
capable of capturing the heterogeneous conditions on the labour market and the
speciﬁc behaviour of diﬀerent groups of workers. On the one hand, it is important to
carefully target the relevant groups of workers and to cautiously equilibrate the exact
values of the tax and transfer rates for a concrete labour market reform proposal
to have prospects of gaining political support. As a consequence, such a tax reform
will aﬀect individuals in diﬀe r e n tw a y sa n dt oad i ﬀerent extent. On the other hand,
speciﬁcally tailored labour market reforms — if actually successful in stimulating the
labour market — have potentially considerable macroeconomic repercussions through
the adjustment of wages and unemployment, as well as the need to balance the public
budget. We therefore need some kind of combined micro-macro analysis.
Most existing studies of policy reforms of the suggested type have been performed
in the microsimulation tradition (for an overview see Gupta and Kapur, 2000). In
general, this means that we estimate labour supply functions for a large set of
individual data and then simulate the eﬀect of the changes in the budget constraints
1implied by the policy reform in question. Following van Soest (1995), models of
discrete labour supply (in which labour supply is modelled as a discrete choice
between a given number of pre-determined hours options) have become popular
because they provide a relatively convenient tool to deal with the complexities of
non-linear budget constraints and the distinction between the intensive and extensive
margin of labour supply (hours of work versus participation). This type of model
has been driven to a sophisticated level with respect to estimation methods (Haan,
2004) and with respect to intra-household interaction (Bargain, 2005). They remain,
however, usually conﬁned to the micro level and cannot address the macro issues of
endogenously adjusting wages, unemployment and the public budget.1
On the other hand, we have models in the CGE tradition (Shoven and Whalley,
1984) that combine a standard CGE setup with a somewhat more detailed labour
market module (Hutton and Ruocco, 1999; Böhringer et al., 2005). This generation
of CGE models, however, cannot capture the heterogeneity of individual households
b e c a u s et h e yo n l yw o r kw i t ho n er e p r e s e n t a tive household. This is problematic be-
cause it tends to blur the distinction between the extensive and the intensive margin
of labour supply. There remains an ambiguity between a labour supply increase that
is due to higher working hours and one that is due to higher participation. Clearly,
this is an obstacle to the analysis of labour market reforms that aim at increasing
participation levels among speciﬁc labour market segments such as low-skilled indi-
viduals. The distinction between the extensive and the intensive margin has been
introduced in some models that explore the middle ground between aggregated CGE
analysis and micro data: the Dutch MIMIC model (Graaﬂand et al., 2001) and sub-
sequent developments of PACE-L (Boeters, Gürtzgen and Schnabel, 2003, Boeters,
Feil and Gürtzgen, 2004, Arntz et al., 2005). This generation of models uses a con-
siderably enlarged number of households which are still thought to be representative
for a certain type of household in the micro data set. This leaves the researcher with
an u m b e ro fd i ﬃcult questions: how to construct the individual households, which
properties to give them, how to calibrate them and how to determine the robustness
of models with respect to the aggregation level. Models of this type that diﬀer in
the characteristics of the individual households can be shown to produce disquieting
1There are some studies that complement microsimulation models with some simple macroeco-
nomic equations to capture feedback eﬀects, e.g. Snower (1997).
2divergent outcomes when confronted with the same tax reform (Arntz et al 2005).
In this paper, we present a full micro-macro linkage with a labour market focus
as an alternative solution to the micro-macro dilemma.2 We start from PACE-L and
combine it with a microsimuation module based on the German Socio-Economic
Panel (GSOEP) with about 3000 households. We are mostly interested in the prin-
cipal feasibility of this approach and in its relative performance compared to more
aggregated models. Therefore, we stick to a relatively simple approach to labour
supply estimation and a relatively small data set. At the outset, we cannot say
whether our model will be superior to those existing in the literature only because
of its additional features. The essential question is: Does the fully linked modelling
approach make a decisive diﬀerence? Whether this is the case or not can well be ex-
plored with the CGE module and the microsimulation module at hand, even though
these modules are not quite at the forefront of the research in the respective area.
Once we know the relevant features, we can go the next step and adjust the model
accordingly.
In other ﬁelds or economic research, the approach of a micro-macro linkage has a
longer tradition than in the analysis of labour market policies. One area where it is
prominently featured is the intersection of international trade and distribution and
poverty analysis. Similar to labour market modelling, one analyses policy measures
(e.g. special forms of trade liberalisation) that aﬀect both economic aggregates (here
the trade and output of speciﬁc sectors) and diﬀerent types of households in diﬀerent
ways. So neither of the levels — macro and micro — can be dispensed with. Papers
in this tradition are Gørtz et al. (2000), Cockburn (2001) and Cororaton (2003).
Rutherford et al. (2005) is a recent example that does not only impress through the
mere size of the number of households considered, but is also quite explicit about
the simulation techniques used. Furthermore, it provides a considerable section on
sensitivity analysis. Like Rutherford et al. we are at the stage where we simply do
not know yet which level of aggregation is best suited to the kind of analysis at hand.
Our ﬁndings indicate that feedback eﬀects are relatively small for most variables but
— unlike Rutherford et al. — in our case an intermediate level of disaggregation seems
n o tt ob es u ﬃcient in important respects. To some extent, this is not surprising since
2Recent discussion papers that follow a similar approach but focus on other policy issues are
Müller (2004) and Aarberge et al. (2004).
3one important diﬀerence between our labour market analysis and the trade literature
is an opposing direction of causality. While the trade literature models the impact
from macro reforms (trade regime shifts) to the micro level (income of individual
households), labour analysis focusses on reforms that aim at the individual level,
but also aﬀect the macro level (wage and unemployment reactions). Thus, the level
of disaggregation in labour analysis may be of particular relevance.
The results of the comparison exercise between diﬀerent aggregation levels turn
out to be mixed. For quite a number of variables, the level of aggregation seems to be
of secondary importance, so that an intermediate aggregation level seems justiﬁed.
However, there are also variables that show quite pronounced diﬀerences, so that
full disaggregation is necessary to uncover them. Broadly speaking, the eﬀects tend
to have a diﬀerent direction for diﬀerent sub-groups of households. This means
that, as long as we are mostly interested in the overall macroeconomic eﬀects, an
intermediate level of disaggregation can be justiﬁed. Once we are also concerned
with the reaction of speciﬁc sub-groups of the population and with decomposing
the labour supply eﬀect into changes along the intensive and extensive margin, full
disaggregation becomes an indispensable part of the analysis.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we describe in
detail the two building blocks of the model — the discrete choice labour supply module
and the CGE framework — and speciﬁcally comment on our way of linking them.
Section 3 reports the results of the comparative scenario analysis. We simulate cuts
in the social assistance level and changes in the transfer withdrawal rate and describe
to what extent the results are sensitive to the level of disaggregation. In Section 4, we
draw conclusions and sum up. An appendix provides additional information about
the aggregation structure of the model and the German tax and transfer system.
2 The modules of the model and their linkage
Our model combines a discrete-choice (DC) model of labour supply of heterogeneous
households with a multi-sectoral CGE analysis of an open economy. Both parts of
the model are at the level of standard tools of applied economic research, but do
not include the ramiﬁcations of the latest research in each ﬁeld. With this paper we
4want to emphasize linkages between both modules, so that too much complexity in
each of the parts could easily distract from our core discussion. After presenting the
two parts one by one, we focus on the channels through which the two models are
linked and that we expect to produce feedback.
2.1 Labour supply: A logit discrete-choice approach
The ZEW microsimulation model combines a calculator for the household income
under the current German tax and transfer system with a discrete choice labour
supply estimation that follows van Soest (1995). In a ﬁrst step, income-leisure com-
binations are being calculated for all households based on household information
from the 1999 wave of the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP). The subsequent
labour supply estimation is based on these simulated income-leisure combinations.
Each individual (single or spouse) can choose from a ﬁxed number of discrete labour
supply options. For married males, there are three labour supply options. For all
other individuals (married women, single females and males) there are ﬁve options.
The discrete options have been chosen so that they correspond to the empirical dis-
tribution of labour supply behaviour of the diﬀerent types of individuals (Buslei and
Steiner, 1999). The options are summarized in table 6 in the appendix.
From an econometric angle, the multinomial logit is a natural starting point for
the discrete choice among a ﬁxed number of working hours. Among the econometric
tools for analysing discrete choices it is the simplest one and is often used as a
benchmark for more advanced models (for an overview see Train, 2003). Adoptions
of the logit model to an AGE setting are rare, however. Among the few exceptions
are the TREMOVE model (De Ceuster et al, 2004), in which the logit approach is
used for modelling the demand for diﬀerent car types, and WorldScan (Lejour et
al., 1999), where it is used for modelling international capital mobility. In a labour
market context, Arntz et al. (2005) are the ﬁrst to combine a discrete choice logit
approach with AGE modelling.
According to this discrete choice setup, the utility of each alternative is a com-
bination of a deterministic part ¯ U that depends on a vector of alternative-speciﬁc
characteristics xk and an additive stochastic term. For household j we then have
Uj(xk)=¯ Uj(xj,k)+εj,k.
5The distinctive feature of the logit approach is that the error term, εk, is assumed to
be independently standard extreme-value distributed. Under this assumption there
is an explicit formula for the probability of preferring option k over all other options
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where xj,k refers to variables that vary across the alternative working hours. One
characteristic feature of this basic logit approach is the independence of irrelevant al-
ternatives (IIA) which results from assuming independently distributed error terms.
As a consequence, increasing the attractiveness of one option in isolation, reduces
the attractiveness of all other alternatives, not only the adjacent ones. Moreover,
each of the other options looses probability exactly in proportion to the benchmark
frequencies. Arntz et al. (2005) demonstrate the consequence of this feature in prac-
tical policy analysis compared to an alternative approach that allows shifting only
between adjacent working time categories. This alternative approach to modelling
discrete labour supply has been used for the Dutch MIMIC model (Graaﬂand and de
Mooji, 1999, Bovenberg et al., 2000, Graaﬂand et al. 2001). Arntz et al. (2005) con-
clude that the fundamental diﬀerence in treating switches between alternatives leads
to diverging results, but that the logit approach is preferable for its comparability
with labour supply reactions in a standard microsimulation approach.
In this analysis, we stick to the logit approach, but introduce a new variant
of linking estimation results from the discrete choice labour supply estimation and
the AGE that incorporates the full heterogeneity of the labour supply estimation.
While the labour supply estimation works at the level of individual households,
heterogeneity between these households has only been incorporated by choosing a
ﬁxed number of representative households. In particular, Arntz et al. (2005) take
account of 26 representative household types with ﬂexible labour supply, 10 single
households and 16 couple households, that diﬀer by household composition and skill
level (see appendix 5). Parameter estimates for the 26 representative households are
calculated as unweighted arithmetic means of all individual households that belong
to a certain household type.
This aggregation level will be the benchmark for the fully disaggregated spec-
iﬁcation that is presented in this paper. Instead of using arithmetic means for 26
6household types, this full micro-macro linkage uses parameter values for all 3000
households that are included in the 1999 wave of the GSOEP. [Stefan: could you
add some sentences on how these parameter estimates are linked to the AGE model?
Or do you want to explain this in the next section?]. Thus, this speciﬁcation fully
incorporates the heterogeneity between households.
In order to receive parameter estimates for the logit analysis that reﬂect het-
erogenous preferences among the 3000 households, we allow for a relatively ﬂexible
speciﬁcation of the deterministic part of the utility function ¯ U. In particular, xj,k is
a vector of characteristics of the hours-of-work options including disposable income
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In addition, these parameters also include interactions between leisure, income and
certain household characteristics (age, dummy for citizenship, East Germany, handi-
caps and children in certain age brackets). These interactions account for diﬀerences
in the preferences of households and individuals for certain hours-of-work options.
In addition, constant terms capture ﬁxed costs of working. For singles we include
a constant for all positive hours categories; for couples, there are two constants,
one for positive working hours of the woman, the other for both spouses working.
We estimate the coeﬃcients separately for couples, female singles and male singles.
Details on the estimation can be found in appendix A.3. The main objective of this
p a p e ri st oe x p l o r et h eb e n e ﬁt of using this fully disaggregated linkage between the
microsimulation and the AGE module compared to using a linkage with a medium
level of aggregation. In particular, we want to examine to what extent a higher level
of disaggregation contributes to an improved analysis of welfare reforms aiming at
increasing participation rates among certain segments of the population.
72.2 The budget constraint
Due to the discrete choice set-up, the budget constraint has to be determined for
a ﬁnite set of hours. For each hours category, we determine the disposable income
based on the German tax-beneﬁt-system using gross earnings and transfer income.
First, we calculate net monthly earnings by deducting income taxes and social se-
curity contributions from gross monthly earnings. The disposable monthly income
is obtained by adding transfer payments to net monthly labour earnings. We con-
sider unemployment beneﬁts (UB) and assistance (UA), social assistance and child
beneﬁts (see appendix A.4 for details).
For each individual or household, we compute the disposable income for all pos-
sible labour supply decisions. If labour supply is zero hours (voluntary unemploy-
ment), no unemployment compensation UC (UB or UA) is assigned. Each positive
labour supply may result in three diﬀerent probabilistic labour market states: em-
ployment (e), involuntary unemployment with unemployment compensation (b), or
involuntary unemployment with social assistance (n). In Germany, UC are available
for persons who have paid contributions to the mandatory unemployment insurance
for at least one year. However, owing to the static nature of the model, we are not
able to determine whether or not a person is entitled to unemployment compen-
sation. Instead, we assume that an involuntarily unemployed person is entitled to
UC with an exogenous probability PUC.3 In case of entitlement, the compensation
is determined on the basis of the chosen category of hours supplied and the replace-
ment ratio is calculated as a weighted average of UB and UA replacement rates. The
(supplemental) social assistance beneﬁt is calculated for the whole household and
all possible labour market states of its members after earnings and other transfer
incomes have been determined.
The distinction of three labour market states requires that the value of disposable
income for a particular category of working time be calculated as an expected value.
Since we make the simplifying assumption that worker households do not save, the
expected disposable income equals expected consumption. For singles, the expected
value of the disposable income for a particular category of hours of work supplied is
3We assume that PUC uniform across households; it equals the empirical share of unemployed
persons receiving unemployment compensation of 0.8 (IAB 2002).
8determined as a weighted average of the disposable income values, yD, in the three
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More speciﬁcally, we have P(w)=( 1−uj),P(b)=ujPUC and P(n)=uj(1−PUC),
with uj representing (household type speciﬁc) unemployment rates. For couples,
the expected disposable income for a particular combination of hours of work is
determined by the weighted average of disposable incomes corresponding to the 9
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For the policy simulations, we use a ﬁrst-order approximation of the tax-transfer
schedule. We disturb the calculations of disposable income marginally at all relevant
points to calculate numerically local average and eﬀective marginal rate of the total
tax-transfer system, which are then transferred to the CGE model.
2.2.1 An AGE framework with decentralised wage bargaining
The labour supply module is embedded into a computable general equilibrium model
of Germany (“PACE-L”). In this section, we only sketch the other parts of the model.
Most focus is on the wage determination module of PACE-L, which, through the
wage bargaining mechanism, directly interacts with the labour supply decision of
the households. An extensive, algebraic model description and a summary of the
data sources used for calibration can be found in Böhringer et al (2005).
Labour Market
Wages are determined by sector-speciﬁc bargaining between an employers’ associa-
tion and a trade union. The bargaining outcome is represented as the maximisation
of a Nash function, which includes the objective functions of both parties and their
9respective fallback options. We adopt the “right to manage” approach: Parties bar-
gain over wages, and ﬁrms determine labour demand on the basis of the bargained
wage. The union represents two types of workers, high skilled and low skilled. For
each skill type, the union’s objective function is calculated as employment times the
value of a job minus the value of unemployment. The values of the labour market
states are recursively determined as weighted averages of the incomes in the case
of employment and unemployment, where the weights are computed from the tran-
sition probabilities between the labour market states (see Pissarides, 1990, for an
overview of the search-and-matching approach).
We assume that the trade union is utilitarian with respect to the individual
households. The marginal tax rates and the values of the states of employment and
unemployment are therefore calculated as weighted averages over all households and
working-time categories. In turn, the wage that results from bargaining in general
equilibrium is used to derive the income positions of all households in all possible
labour market states. In order to preserve continuity of the model, this dependence is
linearly approximated. We calculate an average and a marginal rate of the total tax
and transfer eﬀects for each household and labour market state in the benchmark.
These are treated as parameters in the counterfactual policy simulations.
The two labour markets for low and high skilled labour are balanced by aggre-
gating on the demand side over sectors and on the supply side over households.
We assume that with respect to households the structure of labour demand is uni-
form across sectors. The households captured by the microsimulation model include
all households with ﬂexible time allocation and observable hours of work, which is
about 60% of total labour supply. Pensioners, students, women on maternity leave,
civil servants and the self-employed are excluded in the microsimulation model.
In the general equilibrium model, they are represented by an additional aggregate
household with ﬁxed labour supply. Household-speciﬁcu n e m p l o y m e n tr a t e sa r ea g -
gregated into economy-wide unemployment per skill group. Changes in aggregate
unemployment are distributed among households in proportion to their benchmark
unemployment.
In a wage-bargaining setting, the wages respond to reforms in the tax and trans-
fer system through two diﬀerent channels. First, the reforms change the marginal
burden of the total tax and transfer system (either through an explicit change of
10tax rates or through lower transfer withdrawal rates). This bears on the bargaining
outcome through the average skill-speciﬁce ﬀective marginal tax rates. However, the
eﬀect of a speciﬁc reform on the average marginal tax rate is normally not clear
a priori, because in most cases the marginal burden increases for some individuals
while it decreases for others. With a constant average tax rate, an increase in the
eﬀective marginal tax rate raises the degree of tax progression, which leads to wage
moderation on the part of the unions (Koskela and Vilmunen 1996). Second, re-
forms of the transfer system reduce expected income when being unemployed (and
thus the fall-back position of unions) in two ways: directly through lower transfer
payments and — if they succeed in stimulating labour supply — indirectly through a
higher probability of unemployment (at given labour demand).
Firms
In each production sector, a representative ﬁrm produces a homogenous output.
The production function is of the nested constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES)
type, combining intermediate inputs, capital and labour of the two skill types. Each
individual ﬁrm is assumed to be small in relation to its respective sector. All ﬁrms
in one sector interact through monopolistic competition. This means that ﬁrms can
exploit market power in their respective market segment. Cost minimisation yields
demand functions for the primary factors at the sectoral level and corresponding
uncompensated (own and cross) price elasticities for labour that are used in the
Nash bargaining FOCs. Capital is mobile across sectors, and the market for capital
is perfectly competitive. In the simulations in Section 3 we additionally assume that
capital is internationally immobile, which reﬂects a short- to medium-run model
horizon.
Private households
We distinguish the about 3000 individual worker households with ﬂexible labour
supply, one dummy household with ﬁxed labour supply, and a capitalist house-
hold. The capitalist household receives all capital and proﬁti n c o m e .C a p i t a l i s t s
decide over consumption and investment according to the approach of Ballard et al.
(1985). Their utility function is calibrated to empirical saving elasticities. Worker
households, by contrast, do not save. The structure of consumption is assumed to
be identical across all households. Aggregate consumption is distributed among the
11diﬀerent consumption goods according to a CES function.
Government
The main focus in the model of this paper is on the complex tax and transfer system
for private households, which are calculated in a special programme module (see
Appendix A.4) and then linearly approximated through two sets of parameters: an
average and a marginal tax and transfer rate for each household type in each labour
supply category and each labour market state. Apart from the taxes and transfers
for the private households, the government collects the following taxes: a uniform
capital input tax, a proﬁt tax, an output tax in production, and a diﬀerentiated
consumption tax on all consumption commodities. The government budget contains
the revenue from all these taxes, the public purchases of goods, and the balance of
payments surplus or deﬁcit.
Foreign Trade
Domestically produced goods are converted through a constant-elasticity-of-trans-
formation function into speciﬁc goods destined for the domestic market and the
export market, respectively. By the small-open-economy assumption, export and
import prices in foreign currency are not aﬀected by the behaviour of the domestic
economy. Analogously to the export side, we adopt the Armington assumption of
product heterogeneity for the import side. A CES function characterises the choice
between imported and domestically produced varieties of the same good. The Arm-
ington good enters intermediate and ﬁnal demand. Foreign closure of the model is
warranted through the balance-of-payments constraint.
2.2.2 Linking the labour supply and AGE modules
The microsimulation module with its many households and labour market states,
and with the detailed equations for the budget constraints at all relevant points
proved to be too space-consuming to be fully integrated into the AGE framework (at
the level of desktop PCs where we are working). The two model modules are therefore
kept seperate and iterated to arrive at a global solution. In a policy simulation like
the ones in Section 3, we start with the modiﬁed rules of the tax and transfer system
and ﬁrst simulate labour supply changes under the assumption of constant wages and
12unemployment rates. The resulting labour supply is aggregated (by skill type) and
transferred to the AGE model which is solved under the assumption of a constant
labour supply. This results in changes in the wage and unemployment rates, which
a r ef e db a c kt ot h el a b o u rs u p p l ym o d u l ef o rt h en e x ti t e r a t i o n .T h i sp r o c e e d su n t i l
the two model modules converge.4
Three points in the linkage set-up need a closer look. First, in aggregating labour
supply, we use eﬃciency weighting. That is, labour supply in hours is weighted with
the respective wage rate of the initial situation. By assumption, all individual wage
rates (of each skill group) move in parallel, so adjustment of the weights during the
iteration is not an issue. Eﬃciency weighting corresponds to the assumption that all
labour of the same skill type is perfect substitutable, except for the eﬃciency factor
derived from the empirical wage. Second, when we move from the AGE module to
the labour supply module, the individual unemployment rates need to be adjusted
(adjustment of individual wages is straightforward). We assume that unemployment
probabilities diﬀer by household type (26 household types diﬀerentiated by house-
hold composition and skill level), but are equal within each household type. As the
relative labour supply of the household types changes during the iterations of the
model, a change in the overall unemployment rate (as an output of the AGE module)
does not simply translate into proportional changes in the individual unemployment
rates, but must be numerically calibrated. This is done in every iteration step at
the transition from the AGE to the labour supply module. Third, the AGE model
with constant labour supply needs a closure with respect to the public budget. In
the intermediate iterations of the model we assume that all income changes that are
due to adjustments of the wage rates are left untaxed and translate directly into
consumption.
In general, we conceive the 3000 households in the model as representative for
a larger group of households. This is relevant in two respects. First, we use the
full distribution of hours in the calculations of the aggregated labour supply. (An
4As a stopping criterion, we use a change in the unemployment rate between two subsequent
iterations of less than 10e-5. Usually, the model converge to this precision within less than ten
iterations. Remarkably, the convergence in the aggregate labour supply is very fast, while the
unemployment rates are more volatile, showing oscillating convergenge and overshooting their
ﬁnal value in the ﬁrst iteration by about 100 per cent.
13alternative often used in microsimulation studies is to use only the labour supply
option with the highest probability.) Second, it is justiﬁed to use the probability of
unemployment in the calculation of the expected household income at the diﬀerent
labour supply options, although each individual household member will de facto be
either employed or unemployed.
3 Policy Simulations:
What is the gain from disaggregation?
In this section, we apply the model to simulate a social welfare reform that is de-
signed to stimulate labour market participation of low-income workers. We ﬁrst
explain the before and after-reform situations and then simulate the labour market
eﬀects of the reform in two diﬀerent model versions. Our main interest is in the
fully disaggretated version with all individual households. However, to set things
into perspective, we complement this version with one at a higher aggregation level,
which closely follows the logit model variant in Arntz et al. (2005). In this way,
we get a clearer picture of the exact diﬀerence that is generated through the ad-
dition of a full-ﬂedged microsimulation model. In addition, we distinguish between
a partial and a general equilibrium perspective in order to be able to demarcate
diﬀerences that are due to the basic labour supply setup from those that only result
from general equilibrium feedback.
3.1 Status-Quo-System and Reform Scenario
Germany’s social assistance system in its present state is particularly suited for
our demonstration purposes since it produces strong labour market disincentives
as discussed above. The beneﬁt level is widely considered too generous from an
incentive point of view, and transfer withdrawal results in eﬀective marginal tax
r a t e st h a ta r ec l o s et o1 0 0p e r c e n ta tt h eb o t t o mo ft h ei n c o m ed i s t r i b u t i o n .
Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between gross and net monthly labour earn-
ings as well as disposable income for a single person without children. The grey
line depicts net earnings, whereas the black line (labelled ‘status quo’) represents
14Figure 1: Income function of a single without children
disposable income in the benchmark. Disposable income starts at 600 €,w h i c hi s
the social assistance level for this household type. Beneﬁts are phased out at a rate
of approximately 80 per cent up to the break even income, where eligibility ends.5
Reform scenario
In our reform scenario, we fully abolish the basic social assistance rate for those
welfare recipients who are able to work. With respect to employability, we assume
that among those with ﬂexible labour supply lone parents with more than one child
a n dm a r r i e dw o m e nw i t hm o r et h a no n ec h i l da r en o tr e q u i r e dt ow o r k .F o ras i n g l e
person without children, for example, the reform entails a 50 per cent cut in the
beneﬁt level (from roughly 600 € to 300 €). This is combined with cutting the
transfer withdrawal rate to zero up to the net earnings level that is necessary to
reach status-quo social assistance.6 E.g., a single person without children may now
5"15" and "30 hours" in Figure 1 refer to a weekly labour supply of a worker with a
gross hourly wage of 10.8 € , which corresponds to the mean hourly wage of a low-skilled
individual.
6The transfer withdrawal rate for non-employable single individuals remains the same as in the
status-quo system, whereas employable partners of non-employable persons in couple households
face a lower transfer withdrawal rate.
15earn 300 € net labour income that is not withdrawn. Net earnings in excess of this
amount are subject to a transfer withdrawal rate of 50 per cent up to the break even
income where net income corresponds exactly to disposable income. For a single
person without children, eligibility for social assistance therefore extends up to net
earnings of 900 € (see the dashed line in Figure 1). Compared to the benchmark, all
positive working time categories become more attractive owing to the substantial
reduction in the beneﬁt level. Moreover, the lower transfer-withdrawal leads to a
relatively larger gap in disposable incomes between non-participation and the lower
working time categories. Hence, taking up a part-time job becomes relatively more
attractive than a full-time job.
3.2 Partial equilibrium results
In this section, we ﬁrst look at the partial equilibrium results, where gross wages
are held ﬁxed and the public budget is not balanced through adjustment of some
tax. These results allow us to focus on the changes in the relative attractiveness of
the labour supply options that directly result from the policy measure. To highlight
the extent to which the results are sensitive to the speciﬁc level of disaggregation,
we proceed as follows: First, we consider a medium level of disaggregation by using
26 representative household types with household-type-speciﬁc wages and parame-
ter values of the utility function. The level of disaggregation allows us to consider
household-type-speciﬁc reform proposals such as the exclusion of certain individuals
from cuts in the social assistance level. We subsequently compare this medium level
of disaggregation with the fully disaggregated linkage of the microsimulation and the
AGE model. This highest level of disaggregation incorporates the full heterogeneity
of the population under consideration in terms of preferences and the overall wage
distribution.
Medium level of disaggregation
Column (3) of Table 1 exempliﬁes the labour supply responses for two subgroups of
individuals for the medium level of disaggregation. The upper panel refers to low-
skilled female singles, while the lower panel shows the results for high-skilled female
singles. Compared to the benchmark distribution, the reform entails an increase in
the share of all positive working time categories. The increase in the participation
16rate is stronger for low-skilled female singles (+13.5 p.p.) as compared to their high-
skilled counterparts (+7.2 p.p). The underlying mechanism here is that low-skilled
individuals are more likely to be aﬀected by the disincentives of labour supply,
which are created by the status-quo system. For the low-skilled the relative increase
is largest for the 30-hours working time category. The reason is that the cut in the
transfer-withdrawal rate makes part-time jobs relatively more attractive than full-
time jobs. For example, under our reform scenario low-skilled female singles with
one child, who make up a relatively large proportion of low-skilled female singles,
are still entitled to supplemental social assistance when holding a 30-hours job.
Table 1: Hours Distribution of Single Women
Hours Benchmark Post-reform distribution
category share (per cent) Medium disaggregation Full disaggregation
Low-skilled single women
01 6 . 0 2 . 5 9 . 0
15 17.3 18.5 18.1
30 9.8 15.4 13.0
38 41.8 46.3 43.6
47 15.3 17.3 16.3
High-skilled single women
01 5 . 2 8 . 0 8 . 3
15 11.8 12.5 12.7
30 10.5 12.8 13.0
38 42.0 44.4 44.2
47 20.6 22.3 21.9
While Table 1 was conﬁned to two particular subaggregates, columns (2) - (4)
i nT a b l e2p r e s e n tt h ee ﬀects on participation rates, average working time and sup-
plied hours of work for sub-groups of individuals. The eﬀects for these sub-groups
depend on the magnitude of the household-speciﬁc labour supply elasticities and
the overall distribution of household types. Comparing low-skilled with high-skilled
individuals, the aggregate participation reactions show a similar pattern to that in
Table 1. Increases in participation rates are more pronounced among low-skilled
individuals than among the high-skilled. In addition, the results indicate that the
eﬀects on labour supply are stronger among singles than among couple individuals.
17Table 2: Partial Labour Supply Eﬀects
Individual Medium level Fully disaggregated
group of disaggregation level
PR AWT TLS PR AWT TLS
Married men 1.06 -0.11 0.99 0.87 -0.03 0.88
Married women 0.21 0.01 0.37 -0.41 0.05 -0.34
Singles 6.34 -0.06 6.99 5.28 -0.28 5.64
Low-skilled 2.35 -0.05 2.90 1.07 -0.03 1.48
High-skilled 1.47 -0.06 1.64 1.12 -0.05 1.31
All 1.63 -0.06 1.85 1.11 -0.05 1.33
PR: participation rate (change in percentage points), AWT: average
working time (change in per cent), TLS: total labour supply in hours
(change in per cent)
One important reason is that couple households are less likely to be aﬀected by the
reform since they exhibit a larger share of households with more than one child,
who face a relatively smaller reduction in the social assistance level. Column (3)
of Table 2 reports changes in average working time. For most subgroups, switches
are somewhat more concentrated on the lower working time categories, so that the
increase in the participation rate comes along with a reduction in average working
time. However, the overall change in labour supply is found to be positive for all
groups since the increase in participation rates always dominates.
Full disaggregation
Column (4) in Table 1 reports the hours distribution of female singles for the highest
level of disaggregation. Comparing this post-reform distribution to that in column
(3), one may see that the fully disaggregated model tends to lower the participa-
tion responses for both individual goups. However, the ﬁgures also reveal that the
diﬀerential eﬀect turns out to be much more pronounced among the low-skilled as
compared to their high-skilled counterparts. In general, the diﬀerential eﬀect under
both disaggregation levels can be traced back to the underlying wage distributions.
Figures 2 and ?? in Appendix A.5 show the distributions of hourly wages for these
two subgroups of individuals. Figure 2 shows that a considerable proportion of low-
skilled female singles receives an hourly wage that falls short of the average wage of
18this individual group. Similarly, inspection of Figure ?? reveals that a large propor-
tion of high-skilled female singles features wages below the corresponding average
wage.
Assigning higher average wages to those individuals has two countervailing eﬀects
on the participation responses. First, for those working time categories where no en-
titlement to supplemental social assistance payments prevails, disposable incomes
are generally overestimated. As a result, choosing these categories becomes relatively
more attractive in the medium disaggregated as compared to the fully disaggregated
case. Second, assigning average wage may render lower working time categories rela-
tively less attractive. E.g., with a too high hourly wage, a 30-hours job may fall out
of the gross income range where individuals are still entitled to supplemental social
assistance payments in our reform scenario. Since this phenomenon is relatively more
relevant for the high-skilled, the dampening eﬀect on participation responses in the
fully disaggregated case is much lower for this individual-group. Taking into account
the wage distribution in the disaggregated model captures the relative increase in
the incentive to take up a part time job in a more detailed manner. This is reﬂected
in the two diverging post-reform hours distributions in Table 1. The ﬁgures show
that for the high-skilled, the reform scenario in the fully disaggregated case entails
a larger increase in the lower working-time categories as compared to the medium
level of disaggregation. For a large part of low-skilled females, in contrast, this incen-
tive is already captured in the medium disaggregated case. Here, the overestimation
of disposable incomes in all working time categories dominates, which leads to a
considerably larger participation response in the medium disaggregated case.
T h el a s tt h r e ec o l u m n si nT a b l e2s h o wt h ee ﬀects on participation rates, average
working time and supplied hours of work for the fully disaggregated model. Com-
paring all low- and high-skilled individuals, the same pattern emerges as for single
females. While both skill groups exhibit lower participation responses in the fully
disaggregated version, the relative decrease turns out to be considerably larger for
the low-skilled. Since high-skilled individuals make up a relatively larger proportion
of our underlying population (85 %), the overall redcution in the fully disaggregated
case comes closer to that of the high-skilled. In couple households, the changes in
average working time and labour supply diﬀer among male and female spouses.
Married women increase both average working time and labour supply in the reform
19scenario, whereas men slightly decrease their average working time. These eﬀects for
married women are somewhat higher in the disaggregated model.
3.3 General equilibrium results
This section presents the general equilibrium eﬀects of the reform scenario relative
to the status-quo system, including equilibrium wage responses, labour demand re-
actions and the adjustment in the marginal income tax chosen to warrant revenue
neutrality of the reforms. First, in Table 3, we report the labour supply changes due
to the reform. In Table 4, we then show the most important macroeconomic results.
Medium level of disaggregation
The results from the medium disaggregated model are reported in the left panel of
Table 3.
Table 3: Labour Supply Eﬀects
Individual Medium level Fully disaggregated
group of disaggregation level
PR AWT TLS PR AWT TLS
Married men 0.94 -0.18 0.79 0.76 -0.07 0.73
Married women 0.03 -0.07 0.08 -0.52 0.01 -0.51
Singles 6.10 -0.16 6.59 5.10 -0.36 5.34
Low-skilled 2.16 -0.15 2.59 0.95 -0.08 1.28
High-skilled 1.31 -0.14 1.38 1.00 0.10 1.12
Total 1.47 -0.14 1.58 0.99 -0.09 1.15
PR: participation rate (change in percentage points), AWT: average
working time (change in per cent), TLS: total labour supply in hours
(change in per cent)
With 1.14 p.p., the change in total participation rate is smaller than in the partial
equilibrium model, where it amounts to 1.61 p.p. Clearly, feedback eﬀects, which
are captured in general equilibrium, dampen the upward tendencies in participation
rates observed in the partial equilibrium model. Average working times decrease for
all sub-groups upon the implementation of the reform due to the increase in the
20attractiveness of jobs with less working times. General equilibrium eﬀects intensify
the decrease in average working time: In the general equilibrium model, this decrease
amounts to −0.14% compared to −0.03% in the partial equilibrium model. Yet, in
total, labour supply grows by 1.17 % in the general equilibrium model, which is less
than the growth in labour supply resulting from the partial model.
Table 4: General Equilibrium Eﬀects
Low skilled High skilled Total
Medium Disaggregated
Gross wage -4.40% -1.63% -2.91%
Labour supply (in 1,000 persons) +150.94 +218.62 +369.56
Employment (in 1,000 persons) +138.55 +165.87 +304.42
Unemployment rate (change in percentage points) -0.56 0.20 0.13
Fully Disaggregated
Gross wage -3.62% -2.15% -2.84%
Labour supply (in 1,000 persons) +103.50 +324.02 +427.52
Employment (in 1,000 persons) +115.46 +290.39 +405.85
Unemployment rate (change in percentage points) -0.93 0.06 -0.09
The ﬁrst panel of Table 4 displays the eﬀects on wages and employment in
absolute terms for the medium disaggregated case. The results indicate that, as a
consequence of the reform, gross wages fall for both low and high-skilled individuals,
with the downward pressure on wages being larger for the low-skilled. This is due to
the fact that low-skilled individuals exhibit stronger increases in participation rates,
since they are more likely to be aﬀected by the reform.
The second row of Table 4 reports the absolute increase in labour supply mea-
sured in 1000 persons. The labour supply of low-skilled individuals increases by about
151,000 persons, while the additional labour supply of the high-skilled amounts to
219,000 persons. As high-skilled labour represents a considerably larger fraction of
our relevant population, the additional labour supply of high-skilled workers exceeds
that of low-skilled workers in absolute terms. In contrast to the low-skilled wage re-
actions, the downward pressure on high-skilled wages is not suﬃciently strong to
21prevent additional labour supply from translating into higher unemployment. The
unemployment rate of the high-skilled slightly increases by 0.2 p.p., whereas the un-
employment rate of low-skilled individuals falls by 0.6 p.p. Thus, as can be seen from
the third row in Table 4, the additional labour supply of the low-skilled is absorbed
to a much larger extent by the labour market, with an additional employment of
139,000 low-skilled persons as compared to 169,000 high-skilled persons.
Full disaggregation
The right panel of Table 3 displays the results from the fully disaggregated model
with about 3000 individual households. The labour supply results are quite similar
to those of the medium disaggregated case (see Table 2). Compared to the partial
equilibrium model, the indirect eﬀects that are at work in the general equilibrium
framework again mitigate the stimulating eﬀects on labour supply. In the fully dis-
aggregated general equilibrium model, the participation rate increases by 1.63 p.p.
as compared to 1.80 p.p. in the partial equilibrium model (see Table 3). Note that
the dampening eﬀect on participation rates is relatively smaller than in the medium
disaggregated version, where participation increased by 1.14 p.p. in general equilib-
rium as compared to 1.61 p.p .in the partial equilibrium model. This can be traced
back to the underlying wage reactions. On average, gross wages decline slightly more
in the medium disaggregated model variant than in the fully disaggregated case (see
Table 4).
Contrasting the participation reactions of low-skilled and high-skilled individuals
under the two levels of disaggregation, the pattern of results is similar to what has
been found in the partial equlilibrium case: Relative to the medium disaggregated
case, the labour supply and employment eﬀects are much more pronounced for high-
skilled individuals in the fully disaggregated model variant. As noted earlier, taking
into account the entire wage distribution in the fully disaggregated case leads to
relatively higher participation reactions of high-skilled individuals as compared to
the medium disaggregated case. By contrast, in the medium disaggregated case our
reform scenario leads to higher labour supply reactions of low-skilled workers than
in the fully disaggregated version. As a consequence, gross wages fall less for the
low-skilled and more for the high-skilled in the fully disaggregated case as compared
to the medium level of disaggregation. However, the decrease in low-skilled wages
is still suﬃciently strong that the additional employment of low-skilled employees
22(115,000 persons) exceeds their additional labour supply (103,000 persons). In con-
trast, additional labour supply and employment of the high skilled amount to about
324,000 and 319,000 persons, respectively. To sum up, while labour supply and em-
ployment increase in both model variants, the shares of additionally employed low-
and high-skilled individuals diﬀer substantially across both levels of disaggregation.
Since high-skilled labour makes up a considerably larger fraction of our population,
the overall employment eﬀect is substantially larger in the fully disaggregated case
(406,000) as compared to the medium level of disaggregation (304,000).
In both modelling regimes, the changes in the macroeconomic variables GDP
and private consumption hardly diﬀer from each other. Private consumption shrinks
moderately, by about −0.3 %a n d−0.4 % in the medium- and fully-disaggregated
case, respectively, that is, in almost the same extend. This decline is due to dimin-
ished gross wages that are not fully compensated by the increase of labour supply.
Despite the reduction of private consumption, GDP grows by 0.6 % in the medium
disaggregated case and by 0.7% in the fully disaggregated case. These growth rates
originate from a shift towards investment demand that follows the functional redis-
tribution from labour to capital income.
4C o n c l u s i o n s
The model presented in this paper integrates a labour supply model in the mi-
crosimulation tradition and a computable general equlibrium model. The labour
supply module captures a detailed depiction of individual budget constraints and
a discrete-choice working-time choice. The general equilibrium model features dif-
ferentiated production, consumption and international trade structures as well as a
special labour market module with wage bargaining, search frictions and involuntary
unemployment. In this framework, we analyse the consequences of revenue-neutral
tax-and-transfer reforms that are designed to stimulate labour supply at the lower
end of the wage distribution. To set the results in perspective, we compare the re-
sults of the fully disaggregated version with results at an intermediate disaggregation
level that works with 26 representative household types and a uniform wage per skill
group.
23Compared to models with only one aggregate household (Hutton and Ruocco,
1999, Böhringer et al., 2005) the microsimulation-AGE model assembles the follow-
ing advantages:
• The extensive and the intensive margin of labour can be distinguished. We can
thus break down changes in total labour supply into changes in the participa-
tion rate and changes in the average hours of work supplied, as e.g. in Table 2
in Section 3.
• For each individual household a complex budget constraint is formulated, so
that the details of national tax and transfer systems can be integrated in
the model. This is especially important for couple households, for which tax
and transfer rules depend on the household composition as well as the labour
market status of both spouses.
Compared to pure microsimulation studies, the microsimulation-AGE model ex-
pands on:
• endogenous determination of the wage and unemployment rates,
• closure of the public budget (which is aﬀected both directly by the reform mea-
sures and indirecty by macroeconomic repercussions) through the endogenous
adjustment of a tax recycling instrument (in our case: the marginal income
tax rate),
• sectoral eﬀects: Labour supply changes aﬀect diﬀerent sectors of the economy
diﬀerently, with sectoral factor demand and international trade consequences.
Turning to the comparison of the two model variants (intermediate level of disag-
gregation vs. full disaggregation), we obtain the following results:
• There is no uniform pattern in the magnitude of change between the diﬀer-
ent hours categories. In our examples, we observe more pronounced changes
under medium disaggregation with low skilled individuals, whereas the op-
posite is the case with high skilled individuals. The main driver is here an
24over-estimation of the group-speciﬁc wage rate through the average wage of
the skill group. Assigning higher average wages to those individuals has two
countervailing eﬀects on the participation responses. First, in the upper work-
ing time categories disposable incomes are overestimated, so that taking up a
full-time or over-time job becomes relatively more attractive than in the fully
disaggregated case. Second, assigning averages wage makes lower working time
categories relatively less attractive. E.g., with a too high hourly wage, a part-
time job may fall out of the gross income range where individuals are still
entitled to supplemental social assistance payments. While the latter phenom-
enon is relatively more relevant for the high-skilled, the former phenomenon
dominates for low-skilled individuals. This leads to a larger participation re-
sponse for the high-skilled in the fully disaggregated case than for the medium
level of disaggregation, whereas the opposite is the case for the low-skilled.
• Aggregate labour supply reactions are higher under full disaggregation. The
larger part of this eﬀect is due to a higher increase in the average working time,
but also the increase in participation contributes. Again, this overall eﬀect is
not uniform across labour market groups, but there are also sub-groups whose
reactions are weaker under full disaggregation.
• General equilibrium feedback in general mitigates the labour supply reactions.
This mitigation eﬀect is moderate, but not negligible. The range of the miti-
gation eﬀect is broadly the same with both levels of aggregation.
• The level of disaggregation aﬀects the macroeconomic results for high and
low skilled workers in a diﬀerent direction. While for the low skilled the wage
decrease is lower and the unemployment decrease is higher under full disag-
gregation, the opposite is the case for the high skilled.
T h er e s u l t so ft h ec o m p a r i s o ne x e r c i s ebe t w e e nd i ﬀerent aggregation levels are mixed.
For quite a number of variables, the results are quite close, so that an intermediate
disaggregation level seems justiﬁed. However, there are also variables that show quite
pronounced diﬀerences, so that full disaggregation is necessary to uncover them.
Broadly speaking, the eﬀects tend to have a diﬀerent direction for diﬀerent sub-
groups of households. As a quite general rule we can therefore conclude that, as long
25as we are mostly interested in the overall macroeconomic eﬀects, an intermediate
level of disaggregation can be justiﬁed. Once we are also concerned with the reaction
of speciﬁc sub-groups of the population and with decomposing the labour supply
eﬀect into changes along the intensive and extensive margin, full disaggregation
becomes an indispensable part of the analysis.
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29A Appendix
A.1 Household classiﬁcation for labour supply module
Abbreviation Deﬁnition
CijxK couple, woman skill group i, man skill group j, x children
Mi0 male single, skill group i, no children
Wi0 female single, skill group i, no children
xKi single (male or female), skill group i, x children
i = L (low skilled), H (high skilled), x = 0, 1, 2 or more
Table 5: Household Disaggregation
A.2 Working hours options for diﬀerent household types
Individual Hours Options
men, married or single without children 0 38 49
men, single with children 0 15 30 38 47
w o m e n , s i n g l e 01 5 3 03 84 7
w o m e n , m a r r i e d 09 . 52 43 84 7
Table 6: Discrete Working Hours by Household Types
30A.3 Estimation results from the microsimulation model
Coef. SE z P>z
Net household income -6.44 1.85 -3.48 0.001
Net household income^2 0.43 0.08 5.22 0.000
Net hh income X leisure 0.48 0.30 1.63 0.103
Leisure X East Germany -0.96 0.29 -3.32 0.001
Leisure X nationality 0.23 0.41 0.57 0.566
Leisure 77.59 14.10 5.50 0.000
Leisure^2 -9.96 1.80 -5.55 0.000
Leisure X age -1.11 0.31 -3.65 0.000
Leisure X age^2 0.10 0.04 2.42 0.016
Leisure^2 X age 0.59 0.12 4.83 0.000
Leisure X handicapped -0.17 0.90 -0.18 0.853
Leisure X children <6 years 4.99 0.60 8.32 0.000
Leisure X children 7-16 years 1.50 0.35 4.29 0.000
Leisure X children >=17 years -0.48 0.31 -1.53 0.127
Dummy for employment -2.13 0.25 -8.67 0.000
Number of obs. 540
Log Likelihood -636.0
Conditional logit with ﬁve hours-of-work options (0, 15, 30,
38, 49), SOEP 1999
Table 7: Maximum Likelihood Estimates for single females
31Coef. SE z P>z
Net household income 6.76 2.73 2.48 0.013
Net household income^2 -0.019 0.10 -0.19 0.848
Net hh income X leisure -1.42 0.44 -3.21 0.001
Leisure 169.71 20.03 8.47 0.000
Leisure ^2 -21.13 2.60 -8.12 0.000
Leisure X East Germany -0.05 0.33 -0.15 0.881
Leisure X nationality 0.29 0.48 0.60 0.547
Leisure X age -0.74 0.32 -2.34 0.019
Leisure X age^2 0.41 0.12 3.35 0.001
Leisure^2 X age 0.06 0.04 1.46 0.143
Leisure X handicapped 1.32 0.83 1.60 0.110
Dummy for employment -9.96 1.13 -8.78 0.000
Number of obs. 952
Log Likelihood -1286.7
Conditional logit with ﬁve hours-of-work options (0, 15, 30,
38, 49), SOEP 1999
Table 8: Maximum Likelihood Estimates for single males
32Coef. SE z P>z
Net household income 8.95 5.11 1.75 0.080
Net household income^2 -0.003 0.26 -0.01 0.989
Net hh income X leisure of male spouse -1.46 0.42 -3.46 0.001
Net hh income X leisure of female spouse -0.43 0.38 -1.14 0.253
Net hh income X nationality -6.92 3.82 -1.81 0.070
Net hh income^2 X nationality 0.56 0.27 2.09 0.036
Net hh income X East Germany 5.50 1.87 2.94 0.003
Net hh income^2 X East Germany -0.49 0.14 -3.37 0.001
Leisure of male spouse 56.72 7.15 7.94 0.000
Leisure of male spouse^2 -4.06 0.47 -8.66 0.000
Leisure of male spouse X nationality -0.40 0.41 -0.98 0.328
Leisure of male spouse X East Germany -6.05 2.80 -2.16 0.031
Leisure of male spouse X age -0.36 0.08 -4.31 0.000
Leisure of male spouse X age ^2 0.48 0.10 4.99 0.000
Leisure of male spouse X handicapped 0.76 0.72 1.06 0.290
Leisure of female spouse 79.98 7.00 11.43 0.000
L e i s u r eo ff e m a l es p o u s e ^2 -8.40 0.53 -15.77 0.000
Leisure of female spouse X nationality 0.27 0.40 0.67 0.501
Leisure of female spouse X East Germany -7.10 2.59 -2.74 0.006
Leisure of female spouse X age -0.39 0.09 -4.18 0.000
L e i s u r eo ff e m a l es p o u s eXa g e ^2 0.58 0.11 5.26 0.000
Leisure of female spouse X handicapped 0.97 0.71 1.36 0.175
Leisure of female spouse X children <6 years 4.63 0.31 14.98 0.000
Leisure of female spouse X children 7-16 years 2.13 0.22 9.59 0.000
Leisure of female spouse X children >=17 years -0.56 0.22 -2.56 0.011
Leisure of male spouse X Leisure of female spouse -1.50 0.55 -2.72 0.006
Leisure of male spouse
X Leisure of female spouse X nationality 0.26 0.14 1.78 0.075
Leisure of male spouse
X Leisure of female spouse X East Germany 1.03 0.70 1.47 0.142
Dummy for employment of female spouse -2.55 0.25 -10.09 0.000
Dummy for employment of both spouses 0.61 0.24 2.54 0.011
Number of obs. 1910
Log Likelihood -4186.1
Conditional logit with ﬁfteen hours-of-work options (female spouse: 0, 9.5, 24, 38,
47; male spouse: 0, 38, 49), SOEP 1999
Table 9: Maximum likelihood estimates for couples
33A.4 Calculation of disposable income
Gross monthly earnings are obtained by multiplying the gross hourly wage with
monthly hours of work corresponding to the respective category of weekly labour
supply. While the fully disaggregated model accounts for the full distribution of gross
hourly wages, the medium disaggregated version distinguishes two average wages for
low and high-skilled labour. Low-skilled workers are deﬁned as persons without any
formal vocational training, whereas individuals holding a vocational or university
degree are assumed to be high-skilled. Average gross hourly wages for the respective
qualiﬁcation levels are taken from the German SOEP for the year 2000 and amount
to 10.8 € for low skilled and 16.8 € for high skilled.
To obtain net earnings per month, income taxes and social security contributions
are deducted from gross monthly earnings. The share in social security contributions
borne by employees is taken to amount to 20 per cent of gross monthly earnings.
In 2000, gross monthly earnings of 325 € were exempted from social security con-
tributions. Income taxes are calculated on the basis of taxable income, which is
obtained by subtracting a standard deduction from gross earnings. To determine in-
come taxes paid by each household type, we apply the German income tax schedule
from the benchmark year 2000 to taxable earnings. For couple households, income
tax legislation allows for marital income splitting: According to this method, the
tax schedule is applied to half of the joint taxable income, while the resulting tax
amount is doubled to obtain total income taxes paid by the couple.
Finally, disposable monthly earnings are obtained by adding transfer payments
to net monthly labour earnings The most important transfer payments in Ger-
many include unemployment insurance, unemployment assistance, social assistance,
housing beneﬁts and child beneﬁts. In our model, we account for unemployment
beneﬁts and assistance, social assistance and child beneﬁts, while housing beneﬁts
are neglected. In Germany, unemployment beneﬁts (UB) are available for persons
who have paid contributions to the statutory unemployment insurance for a mini-
mum of one year. In particular, the duration of unemployment beneﬁts depends on
the unemployed person’s former labour market experience and age. The monthly
amount received equals a constant fraction of previous net monthly earnings. At
present, the replacement rate for persons without children is 60 per cent and for
persons with children 67 per cent. Unemployment beneﬁts are not means-tested.
The entitlement to unemployment beneﬁts is thus completely independent from the
labour or transfer income received by the respective spouse.
34For those persons who do not have enough experience to obtain unemployment
beneﬁts or who have exhausted their unemployment beneﬁts, unemployment assis-
tance (UA) and social assistance (SA) become relevant. The replacement rate for
UA payments for persons without children is 53 per cent and for persons with chil-
dren 57 per cent. In contrast to unemployment beneﬁts, both welfare payments are
means-tested, i.e. payments are reduced if either the unemployed person or remain-
ing household members receive other incomes. While UA is only available for those
persons who have exhausted their unemployment beneﬁts, eligibility for SA does
not require any former entitlement to unemployment beneﬁt s .O u rm o d e lt a k e si n t o
account the means-tested nature of SA payments, but neglects the means-tested
nature of UA payments.
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Figure 3: High skilled female singles
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